I really, really hope we get a ruling on IEEPA tariffs on Tuesday, because if the Supreme Court doesn’t start requiring tariffs to go thru regular order laws, US policy is about to become even more chaotic….

At the risk of over-analyzing what might have been a somewhat offhand comment, this suggests to me that Trump has a Section 122 action ready to go within hours of SCOTUS ruling IEEPA illegal. Section 122 would let Trump impose tariffs of up to 15% for up to 150 days, based on a "balance of payments" crisis. Does the U.S. have a balance of payment crisis in the sense of the U.S. being about to run short of currency to pay for things? No. But (a) the statutory requirement can be met if the President determines a measure is needed "whenever fundamental international payments problems require special import measures to restrict imports to deal with large and serious United States balance-of-payments deficits," or "to cooperate with other countries in correcting an international balance-of-payments disequilibrium," as well as to deal with an immediate crisis, and (b) Trump likely has broad discretion over the fact-finding there, and courts would probably be deferential. Interesting that Hassett is citing the 10% figure, however, and not the 15% cap allowed under Section 122. After 150 days, the Administration will have to have figured something else out.

Initial analysis of the Section 232 actions on semiconductors and critical minerals released Jan. 14: 1. The immediate actions taken pursuant to both 232s were limited. Both primarily directed negotiations with trade partners to address the national security risks posed by US imports of semiconductors and critical minerals, with the threat of future tariffs/other actions if diplomatic deals are insufficient. 2. The semiconductor 232 includes a 25% tariff on certain AI chips intended for re-export, the only tariff actually imposed pursuant to either 232. This appears to have been designed simply to give Trump a legal hook for his 25% fee on Nvidia/AMD AI chip sales to China. Essentially, Nvidia/AMD have to import the chips into the US from Taiwan, where they are made, and pay 25%. Commerce will then let the companies re-export the chips to China. Technically, this may let the government structure its "rev share" on China chip sales as a tariff, rather than an unconstitutional export tax. Tariffs will not be applied on imports of AI chips intended to be used in the US. 3. Much US industry will welcome the limited nature of the tariffs, which is also consistent with Trump's recent generally muted approach to new tariffs. The Administration was also certainly cognizant that semiconductor tariffs and particularly critical minerals tariffs would impact China, and the muted action likely reflected the Administration's current detente with Beijing. 4. In fairness, tariffs on both semiconductors and critical minerals would be extremely complicated for US industry: vast numbers of US companies depend on imported critical minerals and semiconductors, and building up domestic (or foreign non-Chinese) supply chains will take years. There is merit to approaching tariffs on these products deliberatively. 5. The 232 proclamations contain summaries of the factual findings from Commerce's investigations, and the summaries suggests the investigations themselves were thorough, careful, and detailed. The Proclamations also include hints of other measures that might be considered down the line: the critical minerals 232, for example, pretty directly hints that a "price floor" on imports of at least some critical minerals is under consideration. E.g., instead of a tariff based on a percentage of the value of an import, a tariff that would establish a minimum price that importers would have to pay, which would provide a predictable price floor for US producers. The semiconductor 232 proclamation suggests that if there are future tariffs on semiconductor manufacturers, there might be exemptions or rebates for companies investing in the US. 6. In the meantime, we will see negotiations with trading partners in pursuit of allied action on both semiconductors and critical minerals, which is a positive place to start. That said, if we want more US manufacturing, we will likely eventually need some tariffs on both semiconductors and critical minerals.